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Abstract
Calls for, and arguments around, fairness and justice are an essential element of inter-
national law; more so in certain areas – environment and natural resources, develop-
ment – than in others, namely, the structural design of the discipline, State responsibility, 
formation of custom and acquisition of territory. The article thus considers the ques-
tion whether there is an obligation of fair entitlement in international law, with par-
ticular reference to various matters of territory. With reflections on the discrete 
questions of territorial loss through sea-level rise and the role of equity in maritime 
delimitation, the article considers the role of fairness and justice in international law. 
The article concludes nevertheless that though fairness is an important and emotive 
value to strive for within legal and political discourse, it can become a dangerous enti-
tlement when it trumps or usurps established rules of international law.
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1 Introduction
In one of the most curious passages in the Bible, Jesus says “you will always 
have the poor”.1 In more modern parlance, this might be taken to mean the 
1 John 12:8 (New International Version).
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minority, the disadvantaged, the dispossessed, the marginalised, or even just 
the merely aggrieved. The point being made is that however worthy one’s 
efforts, there will always be inequality; that it is not possible – or more contro-
versially, always desirable – to seek to correct all wrongs. The purpose of this 
article is to consider this idea within the context of international law; and in 
particular whether there is an obligation of fair entitlement in international 
law. In other words, because something is perceived as being unfair, must it 
invariably be put right?
Of course, ideas of fairness and justice are generic, in that they pervade 
every area of human relations, and to the extent that the one impinges upon 
the other: international law.2 The debates are often most visible in matters that 
relate to, or impact upon, North-South relations,3 and in particular the alloca-
tion of resources, be they financial or natural resources.4 However, whereas 
achieving justice as a goal of multilateral negotiations on such matters as trade, 
investment and environment seems a wholly positive – if not an inevitable – 
outcome States should strive to achieve; as regards those rules which are foun-
dational to the structure of international law, such as the formation of custom, 
State responsibility, and the acquisition of, or shifting title to, territory, trying to 
attain justice and embed fairness can actually be perceived as contrary to the 
attainment of legal certainty, if they are viewed as being relevant at all.5 Thus, 
though the former issues are susceptible to genuine international debate 
around what justice might mean in a particular context, the extent to which 
justice is relevant – never mind can be achieved – on the latter issues is much 
more contested. These are matters, rightly or wrongly, where if justice and fair-
ness exist, they are often perceived as a characteristic inherent to – rather than 
an overt objective of – the formalities of the legal order.
These are, of course, broad themes. For the purposes of this article, I will 
seek to relate them to the particular title of this issue: “self-determination, 
resources and borders”. As a matter of selection, this article will proceed, once 
it has considered the topic in general terms, to reflect on two distinct exam-
ples; first, territorial loss through climate-change induced sea-level rise and 
2 See T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1995).
3 See L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowlland-Debbas (eds.), The International Legal System 
in Quest of Equity and Universality (Brill, Leiden, 2001).
4 See N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997).
5 It is interesting to note that Franck in his wide-ranging work spends very little time on these 
structural aspects of international law.
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secondly, the controversial 2014 judgment of the International Court in Peru v. 
Chile on maritime delimitation. Both raise specific (and very different) issues, 
though each case study in its own way reflects the tension as to how far inter-
national law can – and should – respond to claims of ‘entitlement’ in the face 
of inequity, either actual or perceived. In both cases, the argument relates, in 
part, to correcting historical wrongs but also, in part, to achieving what is con-
sidered to be a fairer future (premised on some form of distributive justice).
There are, of course, many other possible – perhaps even more obvious – 
examples within the scope of the special issue; the principle of self-determina-
tion itself and the existence of the corollary right to remedial secession are 
particularly glaring and controversial instances. In either case, how far does 
such a principle/right not only encapsulate varying notion of justices, but also 
how far might they justify an alteration to the traditional legal structuring of 
States? However, other articles in this special issue touch upon remedial 
secession,6 and I leave it to the reader themselves to consider the validity of 
that particular intractable issue through the lens of justice and fairness. This is 
not (just) a caveat for a lack of space in my own article. Ideas of justice and 
fairness are invariably and ultimately subjective, and on any topic views as 
to what they demand and whether they are, or can be, achieved are open to 
shifting – critics might say indeterminate – interpretations.
Nevertheless, as regards the two instances chosen, there are some very clear 
fairness-cum-justice questions7; though identifying them is one thing, seeking 
their resolution is quite another. The article will conclude by suggesting that 
international law is often negotiated – and disputes argued – on the basis that 
the outcome should be ‘fair’ at some meta-level (and to that extent, both as a 
moral principle and political ideal, the law should always try to reflect a gen-
eral sense of justice). What is much more problematic is to demarcate where 
this should end so as to prevent fairness-cum-justice becoming a perpetual 
legal entitlement; where responding to any sense of inequality or injustice is so 
elevated above other norms that the law itself becomes dangerously uncertain. 
6 See S.F. van den Driest, ‘From Kosovo to Crimea and Beyond: On Territorial Integrity, 
Unilateral Secession and Legal Neutrality in International Law’, 22 International Journal of 
Minority and Group Rights (2015), this issue.
7 The literature on justice and fairness – and the inter-relationship between them – is, of 
course, extensive and diverse. But as to how one should approach the process-driven impera-
tive of fairness with the outcome-focus of justice, see Franck, supra note 2, pp. 22–24, in par-
ticular p. 23: “[a] fairness claim advanced from the perspective of legitimacy may clash with 
a fairness claim based on distributive justice. The two are independent variables in the con-
cept of fairness”.
French
international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 533-549
536
Removing injustice and improving fairness are, of course, worthy to strive for – 
who would deny them? – however embedding them in law as constant 
demands is an altogether different (and a much more legally questionable) 
endeavour. This is not to defer to the status quo– that things must never change 
(climate change, for one is invariably a case in point) – but it is merely to beg 
the question as to the perceived value of requiring, through law, untrammelled 
fairness over all else in all situations.
2  Fairness and Justice in Territorial and Resource Disputes:  
An Initial Reflection
In disputes concerning territory and territory-related resource claims, there is 
a particular tension between the application of legal rules, on the one hand, 
and a tendency – usually within the broader context of legal argumentation 
and the wider political constituencies in which the law often plays out – to 
resort to underlying justifications of justice and fairness, on the other. Whether 
it is determining who has title to territory, or ascertaining resource distribution – 
be it fisheries, energy supplies, minerals, or water8 – arguments about past 
wrongs and future entitlement are usually not far from the surface. This focus 
on justice – qua – outcomes invariably diminishes – though does not subjugate 
altogether – the contrasting argument that the legitimacy (including the trans-
parency) of, and certainty within, a legal rule is itself a manifestation of fair-
ness between participants.9
But if fairness and justice provide a “background language” to almost any 
legal claim – in almost any area of legal dispute – there is something particu-
larly problematic in its use within the stricter confines of territorial disputes. 
Despite the well-repeated adage: “[i]t is for the people to determine the destiny 
of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people”,10 when one 
8 More recently, this has been supplemented by a view that such allocation must also be 
sustainable, see N. Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International 
Law: Inception, Meaning and Status (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008) pp. 173–175.
9 Cf. C. Okereke, Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance: Ethics, Sustainable 
Development and International Co-operation (Routledge, London, 2010) p. 35: “the stuff of 
any theory of justice resides in the principle of distribution it recommends, and questions 
about procedure are relevant only as a means to establish the morality of the outcome or 
combination of outcomes envisaged”.
10 Judge Dillard, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara, 16 October 1975, icj, Advisory Opinion, 
i.c.j. Reports 1975, p. 122.
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reviews the formalism of legal arguments in territorial disputes, especially 
before the International Court, there often appears a distinct disjunction 
between legal rules and broader claims for (outcome-orientated) justice.
For instance, when one considers the application and requirements of effec-
tivités in the determination of territorial disputes, there can often appear to be a 
rather clinical approach to delimitation and title. As Crawford recently asked 
rhetorically (and then provides the answer): “[i]s there a rule of law inhibiting 
the transfer of territory if certain minimum conditions of local consent are not 
fulfilled? … there is insufficient practice to warrant the view that a transfer is 
invalid simply because there is no sufficient provision for expression of opinions 
by the inhabitants”.11 Any broader sense of injustice felt by the communities 
most directly affected by the abstract application of international law in these 
instances is rarely captured by legalistic doctrines, and human rights discourse 
does not seem to penetrate title, and certainly not delimitation, decisions.12
Of course, there are even clearer – paradigmatic – instances in the interna-
tional legal order, revealing very acutely the tension between ‘law’ and ‘fair-
ness’. One particularly good example is the normative clash between the 
principle of self-determination of peoples and the application of the boundary 
principle of uti possidetis; which is often perceived as the ultimate preference 
for stability over rights.13 Nevertheless, beyond this, international law contains 
within itself a more general tension as to the scope and reach of justice and its 
direct application through law. This is often particularly noticeable when dis-
putes are taken to third party resolution, which highlights often acutely the 
normative gap between the claimed value of justice in international relations 
in contrast to the formal need for legal stability and certainty. Recourse to jus-
tice and fairness places international courts and tribunals in an unenviable 
position; as such concepts are neither objectively understood nor will be uni-
formly interpreted in the same manner by the parties or the bench.14 One need 
11 See e.g., J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 243.
12 As an example of limited interest in human welfare in such cases, see Cameroon v. Nigeria, 
10 October 2002, icj, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2002, p. 452: “The Court further notes that the 
implementation of the present Judgment will afford the Parties a beneficial opportunity 
to co-operate in the interests of the population concerned, in order notably to enable it to 
continue to have access to educational and health services comparable to those it cur-
rently enjoys”.
13 Franck, supra note 2, p. 148.
14 In this context, see also the valid point that “litigation is a good way of disposing of a 
troublesome issue when the resolution of a dispute is considered to be more important 
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only consider the evolving jurisprudence, and concurrent critique (judicial 
and otherwise), on maritime delimitation over the last forty-five years since 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)15 – as the International Court sought 
to first embrace and then move away from overt reliance on equitable princi-
ples in the determination of maritime boundaries16 – to reflect on the con-
tested nature of fairness within international legal discourse. As Judge Gros 
memorably said, it is “an equity beyond the law, detached from any established 
rules, based solely on whatever each group of judges seised of a case declares 
itself able and free to appreciate in accordance with its political or economic 
view of the moment”.17
But this merely begs the question: how is fairness achieved in a global con-
text? Claims for fair allocation are premised on so many opposing factors of 
historical entitlement, present-day need and future want that one must ques-
tion the ability or capacity of the international system to achieve justice. As 
Lowe once remarked, “how can the equities of multilateral, global problems be 
established? They can be negotiated, with the result that no state may be in a 
position to deny that the negotiated solution is equitable”.18 Realistically, is 
that as good as we should expect to achieve? Before moving on to the case 
studies, it is therefore worthwhile considering the wider claims to fairness and 
justice in international law.19
3 Fairness and Justice in International Law
It is a matter of contention whether international law has, as one of its objec-
tives, the promotion of fairness and the achievement of justice, at least beyond 
than the result”. J. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011) p. 291.
15 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) / North Sea 
Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark), 20 February 1969, icj, 
Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1969.
16 Crawford, supra note 11, p. 288: “the ‘principles’ are general in character…the term ‘equi-
table’…sets an amorphous standard”.
17 Judge Gros, Dissenting Opinion, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), 12 October 1984, icj, Judgment, i.c.j. 
Reports 1984,p. 388.
18 V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in A. Boyle and D. 
Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and 
Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) p. 29.
19 This section builds upon some earlier thoughts: D. French, ‘Global Justice and the (Ir)rel-
evance of Indeterminacy’, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law (2009) p. 593.
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the rhetorical or meta-level of narrative. Franck argues, perhaps unsurprisingly 
in his work Fairness in International Law and Institutions, that assessing fair-
ness is indeed a valid consideration within international legal norms:
Like any maturing legal system, international law has entered its post-
ontological era… emancipated from the constraints of a defensive ontol-
ogy, international lawyers are now free to undertake a critical assessment 
of its content… And, the most important question: Is international law 
fair?20
Whether fairness is an explicit or a defined objective of the international legal 
system, or is merely instrumental to, or a corollary of, law’s normal operation, 
is however not always clear. And there is a real risk that one can see fairness (or 
unfairness) in every legal rule and process. Certainly, if one looks hard enough, 
one can find the reverse – inequity – everywhere. Equally there is a danger of 
pointing out minor unfairness whilst missing macro-injustice.
Of course, in any philosophical discussion of justice, one often begins by 
turning to the liberal theory of John Rawls, especially as its focus on moderate 
scarcity and the acceptance of a difference principle to maximise the benefits 
for the least fortunate would suggest itself as extremely relevant to the current 
global order. As has been noted, “the difference principle contains some really 
explosive material, precisely with regard to resource justice”.21 Rawls himself 
discounted the possibility of a global understanding in his 1999 work, The Law 
of Peoples. For Rawls, between peoples – in contrast to persons within the 
internal framework of a State – there is no duty of justice.
While there are indeed other obligations governing the relations between 
them, securing justice is not one of them. As Chartier notes in discussing global 
justice, “[a] Rawlsian Law of Peoples entails neither the equalisation of the 
conditions of those who belong to different peoples nor the globalisation of 
Rawls’s difference principle, according to which inequalities are permissible 
only to the extent that they benefit the worst-off”.22 At most, Rawls argues 
there is a duty of assistance limited to enabling “burdened societies to … 
become self-sufficient members of the Society of Peoples”.23 In other words, 
the pull of humanitarian values extends only so far as ensuring a people can 
20 Franck, supra note 2, p. 6.
21 W. Sachs and T. Santarius, Fair Future: Resource Conflicts, Security and Global Justice (Black 
Point, San Francisco, 2007) p. 130.
22 G. Chartier, ‘Peoples or Persons? Revising Rawls on Global Justice’, 27 Boston College Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review (2004) p. 79.
23 Ibid.
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themselves “overcome hardship … and can ‘manage [its] own affairs reason-
ably and rationally … even though the now well-ordered society may still be 
relatively poor”’.24
This denial of justice at the global level, though premised largely upon the 
limited nature of international society vis-à-vis the concerted organisation of 
domestic societies, it is also partially premised upon more pragmatic uncer-
tainties surrounding justice. A standard of conduct premised upon justice 
“may well lack ‘a defined goal, aim, or cut-off point, beyond which aid may 
cease’” and might thus, presumably, be both oppressively demanding and dif-
ficult to implement.25 In contrast, the more limited duty to assist “ceases when 
this goal is reached, it has a target”.26 This need for certainty is, of course, a 
valid one; it builds upon my previous comment that fairness as a constant right 
has the potential to be anarchic and ultimately destructive.
As has already been remarked, one should also distinguish between fairness 
as a goal of multilateral negotiations on such matters as trade and environ-
ment, and its arguably much more constrained role in those aspects of interna-
tional law, which are foundational to its structure and co-existence. In terms of 
the latter, the following seems particularly apt: “justice in a given society, as 
well as international justice if it exists, must consist purely of conventions… 
that will enable individuals (and nation states) to pursue and maximise their 
gains under the constraints of an agreed legal framework”.27
It is within the space created by this relationship between “maximising 
gains”, on the one hand, and “the constraints of an agreed legal framework”, on 
the other, where justice if it is achievable in international law must occur. 
Unsurprisingly, it is those with the clearest demands for justice – the “poor” 
from the Bible that I have extrapolated and broadened for modern times – that 
are (rightly) insistent that the legal framework operates so that gains are 
 maximised for all. Such claims are, of course, increasingly numerous; from 
the  global South, indigenous peoples, minorities, the marginalised, and the 
disenfranchised – indeed, any attempt to be exhaustive would simply highlight 
a category that has been missed.
Moreover, justice will remain a contested proposition in international law 
for as long as the State is both the focus of claims for justice (for instance, as 
regards inequity in North-South relations) and of claims of injustice (for 
24 Ibid., quoting J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1999) p. 111.
25 Ibid., pp. 78–79, quoting Rawls, p. 106.
26 Ibid., p. 79.
27 Okereke, supra note 9, p. 45.
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instance, as regards human rights abuses committed by States). Thus, any 
attempt at discerning a global principle of justice, which centres upon the 
State as fundamental actor, might be said to be doomed to failure.28 If one 
considers this too negative a prognosis; consider the initial wording of the little 
known draft declaration on the Right of Peoples and Individuals to International 
Solidarity29 – noting that even the title captures one of the central dilemmas 
of justice within international law; whether our focus should be ‘Peoples [or] 
Individuals’? The draft defines international solidarity as follows:
[T]he union of interests, purposes and actions between and among peo-
ples, individuals, States and their international organizations, to preserve 
the order and the very survival of international society, and to achieve 
common goals that require international cooperation and collective 
action based on the international normative system of obligations, duties 
and responsibilities, which they implement and practice to foster peace 
and security, development and human rights, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.30
This is a broad – universalist – understanding of solidarity;31 and it is certainly 
wider than many would be willing to acknowledge, or to accept. Of course, as 
a noun-descriptor of the values that bind States and peoples together, solidar-
ity can be reflective of either an expansive or a more exclusive commitment 
between them; a weak or strong style of solidarity. This may correspond with 
the contrast in liberal political thought between the ‘international society’ of 
States and the narrower understanding of an ‘international community’, which 
is comprised of a sub-set of paradigm Western States.32 In particular, whereas 
solidarity in democratic and human rights values amongst the international 
28 French, supra note 19, p. 600: “the State continues to represent, in many instances, the 
least-worst model of reflecting the collective interests of politically-organized, as well as 
(usually) geographically situated, communities…whether States can ever truly function 
as the appropriate ‘vessels’ to capture the internal (popular) sovereignty of their commu-
nities, rather than acting merely as proxies of the same, is perhaps a different – certainly, 
more fundamental – question”.
29 un Doc. a/hrc/26/34/Add.1, 1 April 2014.
30 Ibid., Article 1.
31 See also K. Wellens, ‘Revisiting Solidarity as a (re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: 
Some Further Reflections’, in R. Wolfrum and C. Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A Structural 
Principle of International Law (Springer, New York, 2010) p. 4.
32 R. Buchan, ‘A Clash of Normativities: International Society and International Community’, 
10 International Community Law Review (2008) p. 3.
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community is very much intended to be a self-defining distinction vis-à-vis 
other States, solidarity within the international society as a global value appli-
cable to all is based on more elementary, if less exact, notions of humanity and 
fairness. Thus, if justice is central to our understanding of solidarity, we will 
also need to determine how far – as a concept – it extends, and to whom does 
it apply?
Turning now to the case studies. They can only be briefed outlined, and for 
the most part, only need to be. More important are the aspects of fairness and 
justice they suggest. Considering territorial loss through climate change 
induced sea-level rise, for instance, highlights issues of corrective justice and 
solidarity. On the other hand, the recent International Court’s approach to 
maritime delimitation in Peru v. Chile (2014) focuses more on procedural fair-
ness and distributive justice.
4 Territorial Loss and Sea-Level Rise: Conflating Ends and Means?
The first case study is on future territorial loss through sea-level rise caused by 
climate change and the possible response and ultimately relocation scenarios 
open to affected States. As is increasingly recognised, many low-lying particu-
larly Pacific and Indian island developing States will be some of the first to face 
the extreme effects of climate change; some already have.33 Though substan-
tial or even wholesale territorial loss is likely to affect only a small group of 
States – Kiribati, Nauru, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, and the Maldives – the 
point at which these (and other) territories will become inhabitable and inhos-
pitable will occur significantly before this date.34 Loss of fresh water, irrevers-
ible impacts on agriculture, food production, ecosystem renewal, tourism and 
employment as well as voluntary and involuntary migration will all negatively 
affect the political, economic and social sustainability of these States.35 As 
33 ipcc Summary for Policy-Makers of Synthesis of Fifth Assessment Report <www.ipcc 
.ch/>, visited on 10 April 2015: “Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea-level 
rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilised”.
34 Of course, sea-level rise is not just an issue for low-lying island States, but coastal com-
munities generally, especially in the global South.
35 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Summary for Policy-Makers of Working 
Group ii Report (Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability) Report <www.ipcc.ch/>, visited 
on 10 April 2015: “Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying 
coastal zones and small island developing states and other small islands, due to storm 
surges, coastal flooding, and sea level rise”.
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must be obvious, this is a human rights, humanitarian and developmental 
issue as much as it is an environmental one.
Much international legal scholarship is focusing on what loss of territory – 
as a constituent requirement under the Montevideo criteria for Statehood – 
might mean for the continuation of these countries, as well as a range of 
innovative proposals as to how such States might continue to survive post 
territory-loss. They range from the technological (“floating islands”)36 through 
to the more practical – if politically difficult. To quote a paper by Rosemary 
Rayfeuse and Emily Crawford: “[t]raditional responses to the resolution of 
the statehood dilemma include the acquisition of new sovereign territory 
from a distant state by treaty of cession or merger with another state by way 
of some form of federation”.37 Many other legal imponderables of course 
exist, including the so-called “baseline dilemma” (should baselines shift with 
rising tides?) and the related issue as to what to do about maritime entitle-
ments38 and whether refugee status should adapt to include people displaced 
by climate change.39
My purpose is not to go into this discussion, but rather to pose a singular 
question – relating it to the wider theme of stability and fairness – how does 
one frame such a debate? In circumstances such as these, traditional law seems 
at best problematic and, at worse, obstructive. The law rarely has pragmatic or 
politically acceptable solutions for situations such as these. Equally, we are 
loath to acknowledge normative lacunae. In the discussion on climate change 
and the potential loss of statehood, there can be a divide between law and jus-
tice. Whereas some arguments seek to take the present law and via a series of 
normative contortions apply it to the present problem (e.g., how can the 
Montevideo criteria on statehood still be met if there is no territory?), there is a 
risk that they ignore the wider political and ethical imperatives of a community 
36 See J. Fehrenbacher, ‘Maldives To Fight Rising Sea Levels With Floating Islands’, Inhabit, 3 May 
2010, <inhabitat.com/maldives-to-fight-rising-sea-levels-with-floating-islands/>, visited on 24 
November 2014.
37 E. Crawford and R. Rayfuse, ‘Climate Change and Statehood’ in R. Rayfuse and Shirley V. 
Scott (eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2012) p. 249. See also D. Freestone, ‘International Law and Sea-Level Rise’, in R. Churchill 
and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Global Climate Change (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 1992) p. 109, and more recently M. Gerrard and G. Wannier 
(eds.), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
38 Rayfuse and Scott, supra note 37, ch. 6.
39 Ibid., ch. 3.
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response.40 On the other hand, those arguments, which demand a moral 
response, often fail to engage with the legal minutiae of their suggestions.41
So to return to my question – is the loss of territory due to sea level rise a 
matter that should demand a global response? Almost certainly yes. But on 
what basis is such a response premised? Humanitarian? Moral? Because of the 
legal culpability of those States that have historically polluted the most, or 
those that now are? Ultimately, how might the international community 
respond to a complex and multilateral injustice in such a way that it doesn’t 
become ‘oppressively demanding and difficult to implement’?
Alternatively phrased, before one can even enter the debate, one needs 
to be able to reasonably ascertain its parameters. What rules and principles 
might guide the international community in giving redress to this very extreme 
form of injustice? Even where the call for justice is so apparent – as it is here 
– and the argument is validly made that the law must respond, this rarely 
answers the question as to what the law must do, and what it might entail, in 
any particular situation. Justice may be the objective which the international 
community is morally required to achieve in this case – and solidarity might 
even be accepted as the value which will guide such action42 – but neither 
provides anything like the necessary detail nor can they replace the need for 
reasonably precise and enforceable legal rules. Only broad-based negotiation, 
of all interested parties, coming to the negotiating table with bona fides com-
mitment, can achieve that. Law as an outcome of such negotiation may fortu-
itously reflect a generalised sense of justice, but it is rarely capable of being 
pre-determined in abstracto. Climate justice has become a popular phrase,43 
and it points us in the right direction, but it lacks normative content.
40 One might ask how far discussion of the Sovereign Order of Malta (see Crawford and 
Rayfuse, supra note 37, pp. 251–252) where “sovereignty and nation can be separated from 
territory”, rather than being a helpful historical analogy merely exacerbates the sense that 
the international community lacks the principled tools necessary to tackle something as 
challenging as climate change.
41 The suggestion for the re-allocation of land from one sovereign to another would aptly 
seem to fall into this category. The language is often justice-imbued but rarely normative: 
<www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-change-castaways-consider 
-move-to-australia-20120106-1pobf.html>, visited on 24 November 2014.
42 See also draft Declaration on Right of Peoples and Individuals to International Solidarity 
(supra note 29), where at draft Article 9: “[t]he right to international solidarity entails a 
human rights based approach to international cooperation and all global partnerships in 
responding to global challenges such as those relating to… climate change”.
43 See ‘Climate Justice and International Environmental Law: Rethinking the North–South 
Divide’, 10:2 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2009).
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5 Maritime Delimitation: Mistaken Distributive Justice?
The second case study is at a much different scale, namely the International 
Court’s 2014 Judgment in Peru v. Chile on the delimitation of a single maritime 
boundary.44 This was a particularly contentious delimitation dispute arising 
from a far from easy historical relationship between these two States. The argu-
ments of the parties though heavily legalistic – as to be expected before the Court 
– also highlighted the political and sovereign components of the nature of the 
dispute. The challenge for the Court, as in all delimitation cases, is to ensure 
adherence to the relevant law whilst concurrently being seen to consider the 
arguments and the particular circumstances submitted by each party. As is well-
known, the Court’s jurisprudence on maritime delimitation has proven to be a 
story of judicial uncertainty – if not academic woe – for many decades, though 
many felt the 2009 judgment in Romania v. Ukraine was meant to bring a certain 
level of consistency back to the Court’s approach.45 Of particular importance 
was the Court’s reaffirmation of the principle that “the sharing out of the area is 
… the consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa” (Jan Mayen (1993).46
The principal issue before the Court is relatively easy to paraphrase; it was 
whether a prior – if implicit – maritime boundary existed between the Parties 
at the lateral point where the land boundary met the sea (as Chile argued) or 
whether it was for the Court to delimit de novo (as Peru argued). There was a 
particular tension around the so-called “triangle” claimed by Peru, but consid-
ered high seas by Chile.47 Much of the written submissions were devoted to 
this question by both parties. The Court came to the view that an agreed lateral 
maritime boundary did indeed exist; but only up to eighty nautical miles from 
the coastline. As the Court found:
On the basis of the fishing activities of the Parties at that time, which 
were conducted up to a distance of some 60 nautical miles from the main 
ports in the area, the relevant practice of other States and the work of the 
International Law Commission on the Law of the Sea, the Court consid-
ers that the evidence at its disposal does not allow it to conclude that the 
44 Peru v. Chile, 27 January 2014, icj, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2014.
45 Romania v. Ukraine, 3 February 2009, icj, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 2009.
46 Peru v. Chile, supra note 44, para.111, restating Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), icj, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1993, p. 67, 
para. 64.
47 <pilr.blogs.law.pace.edu/2014/01/18/peru-v-chile-maritime-dispute/>, visited on 23 November 
2014.
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agreed maritime boundary along the parallel extended beyond 80 nauti-
cal miles from its starting-point.48
The arbitrariness of eighty nautical miles – a figure unknown in the interna-
tional law of the sea and apparently to the parties themselves – is not lost on 
some of the judges, both those dissenting and even those like Judge Owada 
who concurs with the final decision.49 As President Tomka perhaps succinctly 
frames it:
The fundamental issue is whether an agreement concluded for…a zone 
of tolerance for small fishing vessels with insufficient navigation equip-
ment, could have implicitly determined the outer limit of the pre-exist-
ing maritime boundary at a distance of 80 nautical miles when the Parties 
openly and publicly claimed maritime zones extending at least to 200 
nautical miles. Such an interpretation seems to run counter to the inten-
tion of the Parties when the evidence is appreciated as a whole.50
The joint dissent of four judges is plainer: “the majority labours to argue in 
favour of the idea that the agreement between Peru and Chile covers a dis-
tance of 80 nautical miles from the continental coast”.51
This curious decision is almost wholly inexplicable without recourse to 
maritime maps.52 And it may be wondered how this relates to the wider themes 
of fairness and justice identified in this article. But what becomes apparent 
when one does review the delimitation is that whereas the Peruvian and 
Chilean claims were significantly divergent, with each giving to itself a notice-
able benefit, the delimitation affected by the Court’s recognition of an 80 nau-
tical mile lateral boundary then followed by an equidistance line has an 
altogether different outcome, almost a mid-way point between the two posi-
tions claimed. Is this a valid approach – Solomon-like in its judgment – or an 
attempt to achieve equity, which is disconnected from the law? To repeat the 
quote from Jan Mayen: “the sharing out of the area is … the consequence of the 
48 Peru v. Chile, supra note 44, para. 117.
49 Judge Owada, Separate Opinion, Peru v. Chile, supra note 44, paras. 25 and 28.
50 President Tomka, Declaration, Peru v. Chile, supra note 44, para. 4.
51 Judges Xue, Gaja, Bhandari and Judge Ad Hoc Orrego Vicuña, Joint Dissenting Opinion, 
Peru v. Chile, supra note 44, para. 2.
52 For an unofficial but informative pair of maps, see <www.unfalumni.org/the-interna-
tional-court-of-justice-in-the-hague-splits-disputed-waters-in-chile-peru-dispute/>, vis-
ited on 23 November 2014.
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delimitation, not vice versa”. The International Court has always shied away 
from distributive justice – recognising that it strains both the foresight (and 
legitimacy) of the Court and the goodwill of the parties – nevertheless, in this 
instance, it seems to have come close to doing just that.
My principal concern with the judgment in Peru v. Chile is not necessarily 
that the end-result is manifestly wrong, or even that the law is misunderstood 
or misinterpreted, though some of the dissenting judges have certainly indi-
cated that there is a significant problem in this regard. Rather, the concern is 
that achieving a fair outcome was seemingly – and most explicitly – guiding 
the reasoning of how the Court came to its judgment. Of course, this happens 
more than we would like to admit, but in this case it seems especially overt. But 
in looking at this case, in the search for doing justice to both sides, the Court 
arguably stretches its judicial role to achieve peaceful settlement, and is at the 
expense of both legal reasoning and the general standing of the Court?
In this short summary of the case53 – with admittedly little reference to 
the  complexity of the argument around the underlying State practice and 
treaty provisions – it is perhaps too brief to come to any firm conclusions. 
Nevertheless, has international law been well served by this judgment? 
Certainly, it seems curious. A delimitation argued by neither – premised on a 
nautical limit not known in the law of the sea – but which has the effect of 
giving to each a more equitable share that what they were prepared to admit 
to the other. If justice is the purpose of the International Court – and some 
might argue that is its overriding aim – then perhaps, yes, it is a positive 
result.54 But if the International Court as a legal tribunal must above all things 
apply the law, then reading between the lines of the diplomatic language used 
in the dissenting views of some of its own judges, this was at best a question-
able decision, weakly reasoned.
And if ongoing respect for the law is one of the major functions of dis-
pute settlement, will this give confidence to either other States in future mari-
time delimitation cases or, more specifically, the parties directly involved? The 
ongoing case of Bolivia v. Chile, which raises even more sensitive issues for 
53 For a fuller discussion see X. Fuentes Torrijo, Comentario a la Sentencia de la Corte 
Internacional de Justiciaen el casoPerű contra Chile (on file with the author).
54 D. Anton, The Maritime Dispute between Peru and Chile <www.e-ir.info/2014/03/18/the-
maritime-dispute-between-peru-and-chile/>, visited on 24 November 2014: “The peaceful 
resolution of this maritime boundary dispute is to be welcomed, especially given that its 
origins began through hostilities and the use of force. It seems plain that the Court 
achieved (even if it was not striving for) a reasonable compromise between the absolutist 
positions that had been staked out by Peru and Chile”.
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Chile – namely an obligation to negotiate access over its land territory – now 
takes place against the backdrop of what might appear to be judicial activism 
that any State would find troubling, but especially so for one of the same par-
ties. Striving to achieve justice between the parties is one thing; failure to pro-
vide convincing reasoning for doing so might itself constitute a breach of 
procedural fairness, if nothing else.
6 Fairness and Justice: A Concluding Reflection
The purpose of this article has not been to dismiss fairness and justice as val-
ues in international law; indeed, as someone who works primarily on interna-
tional environmental and developmental law, they are staple ingredients in 
many of my writings.55 And as these case studies reveal, the rhetoric of fairness 
and justice are powerfully emotive ideas in a wide range of situations. Indeed, 
without a continuous call for fairness and justice, the international system is in 
danger of stagnating at the expense particularly of the global poor (however 
defined). To argue otherwise would perpetuate uneven and often inequitable 
power relationships. As Chimni notes: “[t]he formal conception of the interna-
tional rule of law is minimalist in its orientation as it tends to privilege the 
value of order over that of justice. However, there have emerged, or are in the 
process of emerging, international institutions that seek to expand the scope 
of international law”.56
So why my reticence? Why suggest in this article that these values must 
invariably have outer limits when operating within the confines of interna-
tional law. As I said at the beginning, what concerns me is not the achievement 
of justice and fairness through the application of law but rather the risk that 
they become elevated above legal norms, so that the law itself becomes dan-
gerously uncertain and legal stability is thereby threatened. This is not to deny 
the importance of values; but to question what they entail in any particular 
circumstance. In short, there will always (have to) be necessary constraints as 
to how far law can go to meet justice.
55 D. French, ‘Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance 
of Differentiated Responsibilities’, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) 
p. 35.
56 B.S. Chimni, ‘Legitimating the International Rule of Law’, in J. Crawford and M. 
Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012) p. 293.
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But not accepting a negative is not always the same as immediately demand-
ing a positive. If fairness-cum-justice were to be seen as an instantaneous and 
perpetual legal entitlement, challenging almost any tenet of the international 
legal system, what would result would be little more than a selective pick-and-
mix of legal argumentation. Justice should be the goal, but rarely should it be 
the rule.
So to conclude, as international lawyers we should acknowledge valid calls 
for justice within law – at the same time recognising (if not accepting) the 
inevitability of its unfair application at some point and in some situations. 
Both case studies in their own way revealed the significance, yet also limita-
tions, of always seeking to achieve a just outcome; we would thus do well to 
remember that the role of law is not invariably to perfect inequality, and it is 
sometimes a risky venture if we try. In particular, let me be clear; I am not at all 
suggesting we should not respond to the plight of those in distress, such as 
climate refugees – it is undoubtedly becoming a humanitarian crisis requiring 
a global response – but I would caution against the idea that inequality can 
only be tackled through the dismantling of established legal principles.
